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Abstract
In most of our daily activities and in team sports, we interact with other individuals and do not act in isolation. Using a 
social variant of the standard two-choice Simon task, this study aims to test if competitive/cooperative processing modes 
(i.e., metacontrol states) change the degree of bodily self-other integration between two persons in joint action. In addition, 
and more exploratory the study tested if this effect depends on a shared group experience with the partner. Two participants 
shared a visual Simon task, so that each person basically performed complementary parts of the task, which transfers the 
paradigm into a go/no-go Simon task for each person. Before running this joint Simon task, we set both participants either in 
a competitive or a cooperative control state by means of a dyadic game, a manipulation aimed at testing possible goal transfer 
across tasks. We found significant joint Simon effects for participants who were in a competitive state and for participants 
who were in a cooperative state. The joint Simon effect for participants being in a competitive state was significantly smaller 
than for participants being in a cooperative state. When experiencing the goal induction together with the partner, the joint 
Simon effect was significantly decreased as when the induction was performed alone. Both effects (metacontrol state induc-
tion and shared experience) seem to be statistically independent of each other. In line with predictions of metacontrol state 
theory, our study indicated that abstract cognitive goal states can be transferred from one task to another task, able to affect 
the degree of bodily self-other integration across different task situations.
Introduction
We often work together with other human beings to reach 
shared goals trying to improve the team performance. But 
frequently, we also compete against other people either alone 
(e.g., in a single tennis match) or together with other peo-
ple (e.g., in tennis doubles) trying to achieve group goals at 
the expense of others’ goals. When working in independent 
groups as in bowling or golf, task characteristics of the group 
performance can be seen as additive (Steiner, 1972). How-
ever, in co-acting (e.g., in paddling) or interacting groups 
(e.g., in basketball), task characteristics of the group per-
formance are typically seen as conjunctive (Steiner, 1972). 
The aim of this study is to test if competitive/cooperative 
processing modes (i.e., metacontrol states) between part-
ners change the degree of bodily self-other integration in 
co-acting dyadic groups. Sebanz, Bekkering, and Knoblich 
(2006) defined joint action as any form of social interac-
tion, where two or more people coordinate their behavior 
in space and time to bring about a change in the environ-
ment. To coordinate their behavior, two persons need to 
form a representation of the other person’s action at some 
level (Liepelt & Prinz, 2011; Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, 
& Sebanz, 2010). Cognitive science investigated if and to 
what extent people mentally represent their own and other 
person’s actions (Dittrich, Dolk, Rothe-Wulf, Klauer, & 
Prinz, 2013; Dittrich, Rothe, & Klauer, 2012; Dolk, Hom-
mel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013; Kiernan, Ray, & Welsh, 2012; 
Liepelt, Wenke, Fischer, & Prinz, 2011; Sebanz, Kno-
blich, & Prinz, 2003; Wenke, Atmaca, Holländer, Liepelt, 
Baess, & Prinz 2011) and other person’s tasks (Klempova 
& Liepelt, 2016; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005; Yama-
guchi, Wall, & Hommel, 2018, 2019), and how this impacts 
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both persons’ behavior. A prominent paradigm of this line 
of research is the social or joint Simon paradigm (Sebanz, 
et al., 2003), in which two people share the standard version 
of the Simon task (Simon, 1969; Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 
1970). The classic version of the Simon task is a two-choice 
task, in which one participant has to decide between two dif-
ferent items of a specific category (e.g., color or form) and 
to respond by pushing one of two laterally located response 
keys. This stimulus randomly appears laterally on the left 
or right side of a computer screen, whereby the stimulus 
location is task irrelevant. Even though stimulus location 
is task irrelevant, participants show a stimulus–response 
(S–R) compatibility effect. This S–R effect typically shows 
faster reaction times when stimulus and response location 
correspond (compatible trial), compared to when they do 
not correspond (incompatible trial). This effect is known 
as the Simon effect (Simon, et al., 1970; Simon & Small, 
1969; Simon & Wolf, 1963). Sebanz et al. (2003) trans-
formed the Simon task into an individual go/no go task, 
so that the individual has to respond to only one of two 
possible stimuli, while having to withhold the response to 
the other stimulus. In their study, Sebanz et al. showed that 
the Simon effect breaks down when performing this go/no 
go task alone. In addition, a third condition was added, in 
which the same Simon task was distributed across two per-
sons, each person doing only half of the task, so that both 
persons now share the two-choice Simon task. As in the go/
no go task condition, each person has to respond to only one 
of the two stimuli and to withhold the response to the other 
stimulus, whereby now the co-actor takes over the response 
to the other stimulus. In this joint-task setting, the Simon 
effect reemerged, but now across both persons sharing the 
task. This effect was therefore called the social Simon effect 
(Sebanz et al., 2003) or joint Simon effect—short the JSE.
The joint Simon effect as a measure of bodily 
self‑other integration
The standard Simon effect is typically explained by the 
assumption that the spatial response dimension (left/right 
key press) overlaps with the spatial stimulus dimension (left/
right). Hence, task irrelevant spatial stimulus features prime 
corresponding response features decreasing reaction times 
when the task irrelevant stimulus dimension is compatible 
with the required response. Due to a conflict between the 
instructed and the primed response on S–R incompatible 
trials reaction times are increased, as conflict resolution 
takes time. The individual go/no-go Simon effect is abol-
ished because there is only a single response and hence, 
no left/right response dimension is present anymore. Along 
these lines the Simon effect is re-established in the joint go/
no-go Simon task condition (JSE), because a salient spatial 
response dimension is restored by the other individual con-
trolling the other response key (Liepelt, et al., 2011). There-
fore, Sebanz et al. (2003) concluded that other’s action is 
regarded as similar to ones own action and other’s task is 
regarded as own task, making the JSE a measure of the co-
representation of other person’s action (Sebanz, et al., 2005). 
Based on studies showing that JSE-like compatibility effects 
are also established when one of the two human co-actors is 
replaced by an event-producing object (Dolk, et al., 2013; 
Puffe, Dittrich, & Klauer, 2017; Stenzel & Liepelt, 2016), 
for instance a puppet (Müller, et al., 2011) or a humanoid 
robot (Stenzel et al., 2012; Stenzel, Chinellato, del Pobil, 
Lappe, & Liepelt, 2013), a sole mechanism of action co-
representation accounting for the JSE and JSE-like effects 
has been questioned (Dolk, et al., 2011, 2014; Klempova & 
Liepelt, 2016). Based on the theory of event coding (Hom-
mel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), the referential 
coding account has been proposed for joint action (Dolk, 
et al., 2014, 2013). The basic assumption is that late stages 
of perception and early stages of action planning and control 
are cognitively represented by the same kinds of percep-
tual codes (Prinz, 1997, 2015). Given a similarity between 
internally used and externally activated events (e.g., events 
produced by another responding human co-actor) an action 
discrimination conflict arises during the shared go/no-go 
decision (Liepelt, et al., 2011). According to the theory of 
event coding (Hommel, et al., 2001), action selection refers 
to the selection of a given event that is associated with the 
to be performed action from a pool of all activated event 
representations (Dolk, et al., 2013). When sharing the joint 
Simon task, perceived (or imagined) events produced by the 
co-actor possessing a high similarity to those events used 
to select one’s own action produce an action discrimination 
conflict. According to the referential coding account (Dolk, 
et al., 2013), this conflict can be resolved by changing the 
selection criteria through increasing the task relevance of 
discriminating task features. In the case of the joint Simon 
task, one dominant discriminating feature is location infor-
mation (left–right feature codes). For example, strengthen-
ing the right response coding (of the right co-actor) strength-
ens the spatial response dimension, and hence increase the 
dimensional overlap with the task-irrelevant spatial stimulus 
dimension (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990), pro-
ducing the JSE. Higher perceptual or conceptual similarity 
between both the co-actors or their given responses may 
strengthen the discrimination problem and hence the JSE 
(Dolk & Prinz, 2016).
Even though different accounts for the JSE were pro-
posed, almost all available accounts do agree that the JSE 
can be seen as a measure of bodily self-other integration 
(Iani, Anelli, Nicoletti, Arcuri, & Rubinchi, 2011; Toma-
sello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). The degree 
of self-other integration seems to depend on the cognitive 
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states of the individuals sharing the task (Colzato, van den 
Wildenberg, & Hommel, 2013; Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hom-
mel, 2012; Colzato, Zech, Hommel, Verdonschot, van den 
Wildenberg, & Hsieh, 2012).
Hommel and Wiers (2017) proposed that cognitive states 
related to persistence or flexibility directly affect action con-
trol (for an earlier account of cognitive control state theory 
see Goschke, 2003). According to Hommel (2015), differ-
ences in cognitive states can be characterized by more (or 
less) top-down influence of the current action goal leading 
to less (or more) self-other integration, and strong (or weak) 
mutual competition between alternative action representa-
tions (Ma & Hommel, 2018). Having a task goal related to 
persistence should therefore lead to less self-other integra-
tion, while shared task goals related to flexibility should lead 
to more self-other integration. The present study tested if 
shared goals (competition vs. cooperation) two persons have 
while sharing one task are transferred to a new joint Simon 
task. Further, and more exploratory, we tested whether 
shared group experiences shape a potential goal transfer.
Competition and cooperation in joint action
The bodily self-other integration process (Colzato, et al., 
2013; Liepelt et al., 2012) has been shown to depend on the 
relationship between both co-actors sharing the task (Hom-
mel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009; Iani, et al., 2011; 
Mendl, Fröber, & Dolk, 2018; Ruissen & de Bruijn, 2016; 
Ruys & Aarts, 2010). When co-actors were friendly, invit-
ing for cooperation, their actions were more strongly inte-
grated than actions of intimidating and unfriendly co-actors 
(Hommel, et al., 2009) indicating that self-other integra-
tion is sensitive to the social relationship between co-actors. 
Ruys and Aarts (2010) aimed to investigate the independ-
ence between actors sharing the joint Simon task. When only 
the best subject won a reward, the JSE was decreased as 
compared to a condition in which the team won a reward 
(cooperation) and when a random selection of team win-
ners earned a reward (competition). This study suggests that 
interdependency leads to more self-other integration. Iani 
et al. (2011) argued that cooperation is directly implied by 
the positive interdependence as two persons sharing a task 
need to work together for attainment of a common goal. On 
the other hand, competition is implied by negative inter-
dependence, as both co-actors work against each other for 
the attainment of a personal goal (see Iani, et al., 2011, p. 
442). Further, they argued that the random winner selection 
used in the competition condition in the study of Ruys and 
Aarts (2010) was not satisfying, as competition is typically 
defined as a condition in which one individual attempts to 
outperform another individual in a zero-sum situation (Iani, 
et al., 2011). Therefore, Iani et al. (2011) more directly 
manipulated cooperation vs. competition by instructing par-
ticipants that either the best couple would receive an extra 
reward (to induce cooperation) or that the best participant of 
a couple would receive an extra reward (to induce competi-
tion). When performing the joint Simon task together with 
a person with whom the reward was shared (cooperation), 
the JSE was increased as compared to a situation, in which 
the task was played against another person (Iani, et al., 2011) 
and only the best person won the reward (competition). 
Combining this logic with an analysis of the sequential mod-
ulation of the JSE (Liepelt, Wenke, & Fischer, 2013; Liepelt, 
et al., 2011; Yamaguchi, Wall & Hommel, 2017), Mendl 
et al. (2018) found the difference between cooperation and 
competition conditions only for actor repetition trials, not 
for trials in which the actor switched. This suggests that 
processing adjustments primarily affected the processing of 
one’s own actions. When competing with another person, 
both actors seem to focus more on their own action leading 
to less self-other integration. Ruissen and de Bruijn (2016) 
decoupled the cooperation-competition manipulation from 
the joint Simon task by letting participants play Tetris before 
running the actual Simon task. Couples who cooperatively 
played Tetris with each other showed an increased JSE as 
compared to couples who competed in the Tetris game. This 
finding is in line with studies showing that self-construal 
priming drawing attention to independence reduced the 
JSE relative to a task drawing attention to interdependence 
(Colzato, de Bruijn, et al., 2012; Colzato, Zech, et al., 2012). 
Evidence for a carry-over effect of competition was shown 
by Iani, Anelli, Nicoletti and Rubichi (2014). In their study, 
pairs of participants performed a joint Simon task before and 
after a joint Flanker task. In their first experiment, the joint 
Simon task was performed under neutral task instructions, 
while participants performed the joint Flanker task either 
under cooperation or competition. In the second experiment, 
participants were required to compete in the joint Flanker 
task and to cooperate during the subsequent joint Simon 
task. While the competition effect transferred from the joint 
Flanker task to the joint Simon task indicated by an absence 
of a joint Simon task in their first experiment, prior competi-
tion did no longer affect joint Simon task performance when 
a new cooperation goal was introduced in the joint Simon 
task (Iani, et al., 2014). Cooperation goals and competition 
goals seem to affect the performance in a joint Simon task 
and the findings of Iani et al. (2014) indicate that competi-
tion seem to extend beyond a specific setting affecting the 
following interaction. These manipulations, playing Tetris, 
self-construal priming, or a competition induction, changed 
the task goal of both persons who are sharing the task, which 
may explain observed changes in the degree of bodily self-




To induce a cooperative goal, we adopted the manipula-
tion of Iani et al. (2011), instructing pairs of participants 
that the best couple will win an extra reward. During the 
instruction, we did not specify what participants would 
receive as the “extra reward”. The winner could choose 
from a random selection of sweets. This condition was 
contrasted to a condition in which the best individual of 
each pair will win, earning an extra reward (same type 
of reward), thereby setting participants in a competitive 
task mode. However, in contrast to most previous studies 
testing the impact of cooperation and competition directly 
in the joint Simon task (Iani, et al., 2011; Ruys & Aarts, 
2010) or between two different compatibility tasks (Iani, 
et al., 2014) showing evidence for a carry-over effect of 
competition, we induced competitive or cooperative task 
goals in a separate dyadic game (Colzato, et al., 2013; Rui-
ssen & de Bruijn, 2016) called “Mindflex”. This was done 
to set participants either in an abstract higher-level com-
petitive or cooperative cognitive state and test the impact 
of the respective state on bodily self-other integration in 
a separate task (i.e. abstract goal transfer). The effect of 
goal transfer was tested with the joint Simon task. Further, 
and more exploratory, we manipulated whether goal induc-
tion was performed alone or together with the partner (i.e. 
jointly) testing if a possible goal transfer depends on a 
shared group experience.
If shared competitive task goals can be transferred 
from one task to another, we predict less self-other 
integration when both participants are previously set 
to a competition goal compared to a cooperation goal 
 (JSE_competition goal < JSE_cooperation goal). More exploratory, 
we tested if this effect depends on shared group experi-
ence, which may predict competition goal transfer to 
be stronger when participants experience the induction 
together compared to being alone.
Method
Participants
In line with a previous study testing the effect of posi-
tive interdependence implying cooperation vs. negative 
interdependence implying competition on the joint Simon 
effect (Iani, et al., 2011), we included 32 healthy partici-
pants (19 female, Mage = 23.7 years,  SDage = 5.3 years) with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision in this study. Using 
the simulation software PANGEA (Westfall, 2016) to esti-
mate the power assuming a small hypothetical effect size 
(d) of 0.3, 32 replicates, 32 participants, and 4096 total 
observations, indicated that a planned three-way interac-
tion would be gained with sufficient power of 0.801. All 
participants were right-handed, naive with regard to the 
hypotheses of the experiment, were rewarded by course 
credits, and gave their written informed consent before 
their inclusion in the study. All the procedures were con-
ducted in accordance with ethical guidelines of the local 
ethics committee of the University of Muenster and the 
1975 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
Metacontrol state induction
Metacontrol state induction was accomplished using the 
Mindflex Duel game (NeuroSky, 2018) enabling participants 
to either jointly (two persons wearing a headset) or individu-
ally (one person wearing a headset) control the movement of 
a flying ball. Each headset consisted of a forehead sensor and 
an ear clip. The forehead sensor was placed on the person’s 
correct head area by locating a colored ring on the strap 
above the left eye. With the headset participants controlled 
a puck (fan nozzle) located on the game console. The puck 
could move along a vertical midline of the console. The ball 
could be raised higher or lower by changing the amount of 
attention. Through focusing attention participants controlled 
the movement of the flying ball into a goal position. The 
higher the concentration level by focusing all attention on 
the ball and imagining a picture of the raising ball, the more 
the ball floated up to a height of 5 in. (maximum). Relax-
ing the body lowered the ball. The amount of concentration 
was visually displayed as feedback by a concentration meter 
made of three lights. The Mindflex game was located on a 
table in the laboratory and two chairs were placed on the 
table for the players. For the present experiment, we always 
used the same type of parcour made of a flip frame, a wind 
wheel, and a flex tower with three hoops (for more informa-
tion please see Mindflex Duel game instruction manual).
Before the induction, both players had a short practice of 
about two minutes where each player could test the Mind-
flex device. The game could be played in cooperation mode 
or competition mode under shared experience and indi-
vidual experience conditions, each condition played for five 
minutes.
Cooperation mode (shared experience) One player con-
trolled the height of the ball by concentration level (the 
greater the concentration level, the higher the ball floated) 
and the other player controlled the forward–backward move-
ment of the ball along the vertical midline by concentration 
level (high concentration caused the puck to move forward, 
medium concentration caused the ball to stop, and low con-
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centration caused it to move backwards). Both players were 
required to coordinate their actions to reach the goal posi-
tion. The best couple of all couples taking part in the experi-
ment won the extra reward.
Competition mode (shared experience) One player con-
trolled the height of the ball by concentration level (the 
greater the concentration level, the higher the ball floated) 
and the forward–backward movement of the ball with a 
manual button trying to reach the goal position faster than 
the opponent. The other player also controlled the height of 
the ball by concentration level (the greater the concentra-
tion level, the higher the ball floated) trying to disturb the 
opponent. Roles were switched. The winning points of each 
player were counted individually and the best individual of 
each pair won the extra reward.
Cooperation mode (individual experience) The parcour 
had to be played individually, but the winning points of 
both players were counted together. Each individual player 
controlled the height of the ball by concentration level (the 
greater the concentration level, the higher the ball floated) 
and the forward–backward movement of the ball with a 
manual button playing alone. The best couple of all couples 
taking part in the experiment won the extra reward.
Competition mode (individual experience)  The parcour 
had to be played individually against each other. Each player 
tried to reach the goal position faster than the opponent, and 
the winning points of each individual were counted sepa-
rately. Each individual player controlled the height of the 
ball by concentration level (the greater the concentration 
level, the higher the ball floated) and the forward–backward 
movement of the ball with a manual button playing alone. 
The best individual of each pair won the extra reward.
Possible transfer effects of the different inductions were 
tested in a consecutive joint Simon task.
Manipulation check
As a manipulation check for the induction of competitive 
vs. cooperative states via the Mindflex game, we measured 
three different rating scores under competition and coopera-
tion. 1. Perceived cooperation rating: how cooperative did 
you feel during the Mindflex task? This rating consisted of 
an 11-level Likert scale ranging from − 5: very competi-
tive, 0: neutral anchor midpoint, to + 5: very cooperative. 
2. Perceived team/group rating: how much did you feel as a 
group/team with the other person during the Mindflex task? 
This rating consisted of a 5-level Likert scale ranging from 
0: not at all as a group, 2: moderately (midpoint), to 4: com-
pletely as a group. 3. Perceived task sharing rating: did you 
feel that you were acting together with your partner during 
the Mindflex task? This rating consisted of a 5-level Likert 
scale ranging from 0: not at all, 2: moderately (midpoint), 
to 4: completely.
Previous studies showed that positive mood (Kuhbandner, 
Pekrun, & Maier, 2010) and positive social relationships 
(Hommel, et al., 2009) may lead to an increased self-other 
integration in shared tasks. Besides measuring effects of the 
metacontrol state induction on bodily self-other integration 
with the joint Simon task, we also tested if the induced com-
petitive or cooperative state induction may affect the concep-
tual self-other relation with the including other in the Self 
(IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The scale con-
tained six pictures, each showing two circles that varied in 
overlap to different degrees ranging from 1 (no overlap) to 6 
(near full overlap). Participants rated subjectively what they 
think represents best the degree of overlap to the co-actor.
To also control for possible effects of mood changes 
(Hommel, et al., 2009; Kuhbandner, et al., 2010) that may go 
along with a switch from competitive to cooperative states, 
we measured mood changes (valence and arousal, each on a 
nine-point scale) before the experiment (baseline), after the 
game induction, and after the joint Simon task in two experi-
mental blocks by applying the affect grid (Russel, Weiss, & 
Mendelsohn, 1989).
Joint Simon task
The experiment was performed in a sound-attenuated, dimly 
lit room. The experiment was conducted using the experi-
mental software ERTS, version 3.33e (Beringer, 2000). In 
the joint Simon task (Sebanz, et al., 2003), either a square 
or a diamond was randomly presented to the left or to the 
right side of the screen (Liepelt, et al., 2011; Porcu, Bölling, 
Lappe, & Liepelt, 2016). Responses were recorded with two 
response keys that were placed on a table at a fixed distance 
of 15 cm between both keys (Porcu, et al., 2016). The stimuli 
were displayed on a computer monitor in white on a black 
background, at a constant viewing distance of 60 cm. The 
fixation point in the center of the screen was marked by 
a plus sign (0.9° × 0.9°). Stimuli consisted of squares and 
diamonds (1.9° × 1.9°), presented to the left or right of the 
fixation with an eccentricity of 9.5° visual angle.
Two persons were seated side-by-side and each person 
responded with a key press whenever the assigned stimulus 
appeared on the monitor. Stimuli were presented randomly, 
so that both persons performed a turn-taking task.
One person (left person) of the dyad responded to one 
of two possible shapes (square) by making a simple dis-
crimination response, while the other person (right person) 
responded to the other shape (diamond). The left hand of 
both persons remained on their lap. The sitting position of 
the participants in the joint Simon task remained identical. 
Stimulus position was task irrelevant. Responses had to be 
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given as fast and accurately as possible. Compatible and 
incompatible conditions were determined by the combina-
tion of the side of participant’s response (left–right) and the 
task-irrelevant stimulus position (left–right). For compatible 
trials, response position and stimulus position spatially cor-
responded (e.g., left–left), while they did not correspond for 
incompatible trials (e.g., left–right).
Response times (RTs) and error rates of the key presses 
were recorded. We adopted the trial timing of Liepelt et al. 
(2011). Each trial started by displaying a central fixation 
cross (250 ms). Then one of two possible targets (either a 
square or a diamond) was displayed together with the fixa-
tion cross (150 ms). The response window was 1800 ms. In 
the case of a correct response, the fixation cross was given 
as feedback (300 ms). When a wrong response was given, 
the error feedback (“Fehler”, engl. “Error”) was provided 
(300 ms). When no response was given within the response 
window time of 1800 ms, the feedback “zu langsam” (engl. 
“too slow”) was shown (300 ms). After the feedback, a con-
stant inter-trial interval of 1750 ms was provided (Liepelt, 
et al., 2011).
Prior to the experimental session, participants performed 
16 practice trials, followed by the experimental phase of 256 
trials for each dyad split in two blocks.
Study design
A 2 (compatibility) × 2 (shared experience) × 2 (metacontrol 
state) mixed factorial design was applied with compatibil-
ity and shared experience, both as within-subjects factors 
and metacontrol state as a between-subjects factor. While 
compatibility varied randomly within each block, the fac-
tor Shared experience1 was counterbalanced across pairs of 
participants.
Results
Manipulation check (competition vs. cooperation 
state induction) and emotional controls
As a manipulation check to test if the competitive/coopera-
tive state induction was effective via the Mindflex game, we 
performed a Mann–Whitney U test with metacontrol state 
(competition, cooperation) as a between-subjects factor on 
the perceived cooperation ratings, perceived team/group rat-
ings, and the perceived task sharing ratings regarding the 
Mindflex game (see Fig. 1). Descriptive values of the ratings 
are also displayed.
The perceived cooperation ratings showed a significantly 
lower rating score after the competition induction (− 0.81) 
than after the cooperation induction (2.38) (p < 0.001). 
For the perceived team/group ratings, we observed a sig-
nificant lower rating score after the competition induction 
(1.56) than after cooperation induction (3.25) (p < 0.001). 
The perceived task sharing ratings indicated a significantly 
lower rating score after the competition induction (1.06) 
than after the cooperation induction (3.00) in the Mindflex 
game (p < 0.001).
To control for potential emotional changes between 
competition and cooperation conditions, we submitted the 
affect grid rating data (Russel, et al., 1989) for valence and 
arousal to a Mann–Whitney U test with Metacontrol state 
Fig. 1  Mean state induction ratings through the Mindflex game and 
standard deviations (error bars) under competition mode and coop-
eration mode for perceived cooperation ratings (left), perceived team/




































Fig. 2  Mean valence rating changes and standard deviations (error 
bars) under cooperation mode and competition mode at the beginning 
of the experiment (baseline) and after the first Mindflex game (Game 
1), the first Simon block (Simon 1), the second Mindflex game (Game 
2), and the second Simon block (Simon 2)
1 We performed an additional analysis adding order of the shared 
experience (performing the induction alone or together with the part-
ner) to the planned analysis. This analysis showed that there was nei-
ther a main effect of order, nor any interaction effects with other fac-
tors (all ps between > .17 and .95).
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(competition, cooperation) as a between-subjects factor. The 
valence ratings (see Fig. 2) did not differ between coop-
eration and competition (all ps > 0.18). Arousal ratings (see 
Fig. 3) did not differ for baseline, Game 1, Simon block 1, 
and Simon block 2 (all ps > 0.11). The only significant dif-
ference for arousal was observed after Game 2 (see Fig. 3), 
indicating lower arousal under competition game induction 
(6.44) than after the cooperation induction (7.44) (p < 0.05).
Response times
Incorrect responses (2.5%) and all trials in which RTs less 
than 150 ms or greater than 1000 ms (Dolk, et al., 2013; 
Liepelt, et al., 2011; Röder, Kusmierek, Spence, & Schicke, 
2007) were excluded for statistical analysis. We submitted 
RTs to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with compatibility 
(compatible, incompatible), and shared experience (playing 
alone, playing together with a partner) as within-subjects 
factors and metacontrol state (competition, cooperation) as 
a between-subjects factor.
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
compatibility, F(1, 30) = 30.46, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.50, indi-
cating response times to be faster in S–R compatible (mean 
RT = 342 ms, standard error, SE = 6 ms) than in S-R incom-
patible conditions (mean RT = 357 ms, SE = 8 ms). Neither 
the main effect of Metacontrol state, F(1, 30) = 1.16, p = 0.29, 
ηp2 = 0.04, nor the main effect of Shared experience, (F < 1), 
was significant. The interaction of metacontrol state × compat-
ibility (see Fig. 4) was significant, F(1, 30) = 4.55, p < 0.05, 
ηp2 = 0.13, indicating that the S–R compatibility effect was 
significantly smaller in the competition mode (9 ms) than in 
the cooperation mode (21 ms). The interaction of shared expe-
rience × compatibility (see Fig. 5) was significant, as well, 
F(1, 30) = 4.22, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.12, showing that the S–R 
compatibility effect was significantly smaller when the induc-
tion was performed together with a partner (11 ms) than when 
Fig. 3  Mean Arousal rating changes and standard deviations (error 
bars) under cooperation mode and competition mode at the beginning 
of the experiment (baseline) and after the first Mindflex game (Game 
1), the first Simon block (Simon 1), the second Mindflex game (Game 
2), and the second Simon block (Simon 2). *p < 0.05
Fig. 4  S–R compatibility effect (= JSE) under competition (left side) 
and cooperation (right side). C compatible, IC incompatible. Error 
bars represent standard errors of the mean. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
Fig. 5  S–R compatibility effect (= JSE) under individual experi-
ence (left side) and shared experience (right side). C compatible, 
IC incompatible. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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the induction was performed alone (18 ms). The three-way 
interaction of compatibility × metacontrol state × shared expe-
rience was, however, not significant, F(1, 30) = 1.09, p = 0.31, 
ηp2 = 0.04, indicating that both effects of metacontrol state and 
shared experience are statistically independent of each other 
(see Table 1).
Error rates (see Table 2) were rather low, due to the ease of 
the joint Simon task. Only the main effect of compatibility was 
significant, F(1, 30) = 12.81, p < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.30, indicating 
smaller error rates in S–R compatible (1.2%, SE = 0.29) than in 
S–R incompatible conditions (3.9%, SE = 0.76). All other main 
effects or interactions were not significant (F < 1.93, p > 0.17).
Effects of competitive and cooperative state 
induction and conceptual self‑other relation
We submitted the IOS scale data (Aron, et al., 1992) to a 
Mann–Whitney U test with metacontrol state (competition, 
cooperation) as a between-subjects factor (see Fig. 6). We 
found no significant differences in the IOS ratings between 
the competition induction (2.6) and the cooperation induc-
tion (3.1) (p > 0.36).
Discussion
The joint Simon effect is considered as a marker for bod-
ily self-other integration in joint action (Colzato, Zech, 
et al., 2012). This study tested two questions with regard 
to self-other integration. First, does a competitive process-
ing mode (i.e. metacontrol state) between partners change 
the degree of self-other integration in joint action? Second, 
and more exploratory, does competition transfer depend on 
a shared group experience with a joint action partner?
The data of our manipulation check indicates that the 
induction of the different processing modes (competition 
and cooperation) effectively worked via shared game experi-
ence. Our results showed that a competitive processing mode 
produces less bodily self-other integration than a cooperative 
processing mode (Hommel, et al., 2009; Iani, et al., 2011, 
2014) as indexed by a transfer effect to a Joint Simon Task 
that was performed after the state induction. In line with pre-
vious studies (Iani, et al., 2014; Ruissen & de Bruijn, 2016) 
our findings indicate that the specific metacontrol state a 
dyadic pair was set to (i.e., competition or cooperation) was 
transferable to a fully new dyadic task. The transferable 
metacontrol state can therefore be considered as an abstract 
control policy acting on a lower level process of bodily self-
other integration. The finding that less bodily self-other inte-
gration is observed under a competitive processing mode 
than under a cooperative processing mode (Hommel, et al., 
2009; Iani, et al., 2011, 2014) in a consecutively performed 
joint Simon Task is in line with findings from social psy-
chology (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Sassenberg, Moskow-
itz, Jacoby, & Jansen, 2007). These studies show that par-
ticipant’s seem to behave in line with a primed mindset 
even in a new and task unrelated context. Our first question 
can, therefore, be clearly answered with yes. A competi-
tive processing mode (i.e. metacontrol state) between part-
ners reduces the degree of bodily self-other integration as 
compared to a cooperative processing mode. Even though 
the joint Simon effect was significantly reduced following 
a competitive induction, it was nevertheless present after 
Table 1  Response times (standard errors SE in brackets) for S–R 
compatible (C) and S–R incompatible (IC) conditions under coopera-
tion and competition, when induction was performed together (shared 
experience) and alone (individual experience)
Cooperation Competition
Shared experience Individual 
experience
Shared experience Individual 
experience
C 334 (9) 329 (9) 354 (9) 351 (9)
IC 349 (10) 356 (12) 361 (10) 362 (12)
Table 2  Mean error rates (M) and standard errors (SE) for S–R com-
patible and S–R incompatible conditions under cooperation mode and 
competition mode, when induction was performed alone and together
S–R compatible S–R incompatible
M SE M SE
Cooperation 1.5 0.4 4.8 1.1
Competition 1.0 0.4 2.9 1.1
Alone 1.2 0.3 4.4 1.0
Together 1.3 0.4 3.3 0.6
Fig. 6  Mean IOS rating changes and standard deviations (error bars) 
under competition mode and cooperation mode
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competition with the same co-actor. This is different to find-
ings of Iani et al. (2014) showing a complete absence of the 
joint Simon effect after having performed a joint Flanker 
task in competition. One difference between our study and 
the study of Iani et al. (2014), which could explain this dif-
ference, is the similarity between the induction task and 
the transfer task applied. The joint Simon task is a spatial 
compatibility task and the joint Flanker task is non-spatial 
in nature. However, these two tasks have more similarities 
than the Mindflex task of our study and the joint Simon task. 
The joint Simon and the joint Flanker task are both S–R 
compatibility tasks with overt spatially distributed manual 
responses (the joint Flanker task containing an additional 
S–S compatibility effect). Opposed to this, our Mindflex task 
is much more abstract and mental in nature possessing much 
less overlap with the joint Simon task. Applied task sets 
that are activated or deactivated by the respective goal will 
therefore probably lead to a much more complete “competi-
tion transfer” in the study of Iani et al. (2014) than in ours. 
This speculation could explain why the reduced joint Simon 
effect following a competitive induction was still significant 
in our study. Furthermore, based on the findings of Iani et al. 
(2014), the conclusion that the metacontrol transfer, which 
we observed in our study, might be better explained with a 
transfer of competition (not a transfer of cooperation) seems 
justified.
In contrast to the competition transfer that we observed 
in the joint Simon task, the competitive state vs. coopera-
tive state induction did not affect the subjective conceptual 
self-other relation measured with the IOS scale (Aron, et al., 
1992). In a recent review (Quintard, Jouffre, Hommel, & 
Bouquet, 2020), the impact of romantic love and corre-
sponding positive affects due to romantic feelings have been 
proposed to bias metacontrol states towards flexibility vs. 
integration also affecting overlapping bodily self-other rep-
resentations. In line with this proposal, we found evidence 
for such metacontrol biases on bodily self-other represen-
tations (i.e. the JSE). However, the short-term competitive 
state vs. cooperative state induction that we used to imple-
ment different metacontrol state biases, did not affect the 
conceptual self-other relation between the two co-actors in a 
way that would be predicted with long-term varying degrees 
of romantic love and passion felt for the partner as shown 
in couples (Quintard, Jouffre, Croizet, Bouquet, 2020). This 
seems to suggest that the degree of bodily self-other repre-
sentations may be more flexible and easier to change online 
than conceptual self-other relations, as the latter have been 
shown to be the product of long-term experiences and long-
lasting relations (Quintard, Jouffre, Croizet, et al., 2020). 
The different degrees of bodily self-other representations 
varied through different types of metacontrol states, as 
done in our study, seem to be sensitive to the current online 
interaction situation. On the other hand, changing degrees 
of conceptual self-other relation varied through different 
degrees of passion and romantic love, may be more strongly 
related to the type of the long-term interactive social relation 
between persons.
Alternative emotional accounts
Some studies showed that the degree of self-other integra-
tion does increase when participants are in a positive mood 
state (Kuhbandner, et al., 2010) or when interacting with a 
friendly interaction partner (Hommel, et al., 2009). It may 
be possible that decreased bodily self-other integration 
effects when being in a competitive processing mode than 
in a cooperative processing mode may be indirect effects 
of mood changes, since competition may lead to a more 
negative mood state than cooperation. However, our affect 
grid data did not show evidence for a decrease in valence 
under the competition than under the cooperation induc-
tion. Therefore, we consider an indirect emotional effect 
assuming negative mood to be the cause for the observed 
decrease of bodily self-other integration under competition 
in our study unlikely. However, we found evidence for lower 
arousal when being in a competition mode than in a coop-
eration mode, at least directly after second game induction. 
Decreasing arousal levels after the competition game might 
therefore contribute to the observed differences in the size 
of the JSE found between competitive and cooperative pro-
cessing modes. The relation between changing metacontrol 
states and potentially corresponding arousal changes may 
therefore be worthwhile further investigation.
Effects of shared experience on self‑other 
integration
Regarding our second question, our exploratory results show 
for the first time that being together with the partner during 
the induction phase decreases bodily self-other integration in 
a consecutive joint Simon task as compared to a situation in 
which the induction was performed alone. Bodily self-other 
integration was smaller (and not larger) when the induc-
tion was performed jointly, as compared to an individual 
induction. This finding may be in line with considerations 
assuming competition transfer and not cooperation transfer 
(Iani, et al., 2014), as discussed also in the current study. 
However, as we did not include a neutral baseline condi-
tion in our study, this finding might also be explained by 
the assumption that participants decrease their effort during 
the joint Simon task after having experienced the induction 
phase together with the partner and mobilized more effort 
when having experienced the induction alone. The fear of 
losing might actually be higher after virtually interacting 
with a person with whom another task will be shared later 
on physically. What our findings imply is that the former 
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effect of metacontrol state transfer seems not to depend on a 
shared group experience, as both effects (metacontrol state 
and shared experience) seem to be statistically independent 
of each other. However, this conclusion should be taken with 
care, as the findings regarding shared experience were more 
exploratory and our sample size was not too large. Yet, the 
lack of a statistical three-way interaction seems not to be 
due to insufficient power as implied by our power simula-
tion showing that not only the number of participants, but 
also the number of data points seem to be decisive for power 
estimations. Therefore, we would consider the factors metac-
ontrol state and shared experience, as two separate factors.
The metacontrol states we induced contain a rather 
abstract competition goal. Thus, a new finding of our study 
is that abstract cognitive goal states seem to be transferable 
in socially shared task contexts, an assumption that is in 
line with the theorizing of different metacontrol state theo-
ries (Goschke, 2003; Hommel, 2015). The reason why we 
think this transfer relates to relatively abstract cognitive goal 
states is, because we found evidence for transfer between a 
relatively abstract mentally shared task and a shared action-
oriented spatial S-R compatibility task, impacting the degree 
of bodily self-other integration in joint action.
A competition mindset affects bodily self‑other 
integration
Our finding of a reduced Simon effect after competitive 
metacontrol state induction is in line with traditional theories 
from social psychology, such as the group conflict theory 
(Campbell, 1965). One assumption of this theory that has 
been lately stressed is that negative interdependence between 
different groups leads to prejudice and social discrimination 
(Iani, et al., 2014; Sassenberg, et al., 2007). Perceiving a 
conflict is enough to produce effects of prejudice (Esses, 
Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998) suggesting effects of com-
petition beyond the current situation allowing for possible 
transfer. The concept of metacontrol has a lot in common 
with the concept of mindset (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & 
Steller, 1990). Mindset has been defined as a cognitive pro-
cedure relevant for choosing between different goal alter-
natives, producing action planning to attain certain action 
goals (Gollwitzer, et al., 1990; Sassenberg, et al., 2007). 
Sassenberg et al. (2007) showed that competition effects can 
be transferred leading to higher levels of prejudice even in 
new situations and with new persons that were not involved 
in actual competition. Our findings are in line with the latter 
findings also showing that effects of competition do impact 
social interaction up to the bodily level of self-other integra-
tion. Further, our findings suggest that transfer effects of 
competition can be produced virtually without much bodily 
social interaction with another person. An interesting line 
for future research would be to test if the metacontrol state 
effect we observed is not only transferable to new task situ-
ations, but if this effect would even survive a change of the 
involved co-actor.
Implications of metacontrol state transfer 
for theories on joint action
The present findings do not differentiate between the differ-
ent theoretical accounts (action co-representation and refer-
ential coding). But our findings may have implications for 
both accounts. Assuming that the joint Simon effect is the 
result of automatic action co-representation (Kiernan, et al., 
2012; Sebanz, et al., 2003, 2005), the given findings showing 
a modulation of the joint Simon effect due to a previously 
established metacontrol state suggest that co-representation 
is not fully automatic, but may be context dependent. The 
independence that is established between two persons by 
competition affects the amount and strength of co-represen-
tation in a new dyadic situation. That competitive or coop-
erative task goals affect subsequent interaction behavior may 
be taken as evidence for the strength of social situatedness 
and the role of social embedding (Barsalou, 2008; Vygotsky, 
1978). Referential coding assumes that the joint Simon effect 
arises from self-other integration of similar action events and 
the corresponding need to discriminate between them (Dolk, 
et al., 2013). The degree of actual and perceived similarity 
between own and others actions determines the strength of 
the required action discrimination. Taken the given findings 
and effects of metacontrol on the joint Simon effect in light 
of referential coding may suggest that setting up abstract 
competition and cooperation goals affect the amount of per-
ceived similarity of both action partners in a task independ-
ent way. Perceiving an interaction partner as less similar, 
due to a previously induced competitive action goal, seem 
to reduce the need to discriminate between own and others 
actions by means of referential coding.
Our findings also have implications for applied joint 
action situations. For instance, in sports it’s natural that ath-
letes of the same team cooperate in competitions however 
they as well compete of the very few places in the starting 
squad or in the national team. The way how coaches may 
instruct athletes on the competitive and cooperative nature 
of training and actions may change the way to perceive your 
teammates and jointly shared action goals.
A limitation of our study is that we cannot clearly distin-
guish if the given findings are due to less bodily self-other 
integration under the competition goal or more self-other 
integration under the cooperation goal, as we had no neutral 
condition involved. However, as previous work (Iani, et al., 
2014; Sassenberg, et al., 2007) have shown clear evidence 
for the former, and there is evidence that participants typi-
cally perceive a “neutral” social task as being cooperatively 
(Iani, et al., 2011), we think that the assumption of a reduced 
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bodily self-other integration under competition is plausible 
and in line with the given literature. From these previous 
studies it becomes evident that finding a good neutral condi-
tion is always difficult, as this condition may be reinterpreted 
positive by the participants in terms of interdependence. 
Further, due to the relatively small basic joint Simon effect, 
adding further factors to the design is likely to diminish 
chances of finding additional interaction effects.
In sum, our findings show the role of abstract cogni-
tive states controlling task features relevant for joint action 
research providing evidence in favor of metacontrol state 
theories (Dreisbach, 2006; Goschke, 2003; Hommel, 2015). 
Our study suggests that metacontrol state theories seem to 
apply to social dyadic interactions, as well. Understanding 
if and how shared goals transfer from one task to another 
may help to foster the understanding of when competition 
or cooperation is beneficial in consecutively changing social 
environments and interaction contexts.
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